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oreclosure notices have been filed on about 6 million
American homes since January 2007, according to
RealtyTrac. To try to reduce foreclosures, the federal
government has implemented multiple programs. They
include bringing borrowers and mortgage servicers
together, reducing monthly payments and interest rates,
extending loan terms, and delaying or reducing principal.
President Obama announced in February the most recent
government action, a mortgage loan modification and refi-
nancing program called “Making Home Affordable.” 
Making Home Affordable gives mortgage servicers an
upfront payment of $1,000 for each successful modification
after completion of a trial period and “pay for success” fees
of up to $1,000 per year for up to five years if the borrower
remains current. Homeowners may also earn up to $1,000 a
year for five years for principal reduction if they stay current
and pay on time. Refinancing would also be available, but
borrowers may face higher payments when switching from
adjustable to fixed-rate mortgages. 
For the modification program, borrowers must have a
monthly payment greater than 31 percent of their monthly
income. For the refinancing program, the mortgages must
be guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac and the 
borrower cannot owe more than 125 percent of the home’s
current value on their first mortgage. 
To date, the U.S. Department of the Treasury  has signed
contracts with more than 45 servicers to participate in
Making Home Affordable. Between loans covered by those
servicers and loans owned or guaranteed by Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, about 85 percent of loans in the country 
are covered by the program. But since the policy took 
effect, only 12 percent of eligible borrowers have modified
their loans. 
A Boston Fed paper finds that fewer than 8 percent of
seriously delinquent borrowers have had their mortgages
modified since 2007. For a lender, the decision to modify a
loan is a gamble for two reasons. First, about 30 percent of
delinquent loans will “self-cure” — meaning the borrower
will eventually be able to make the existing payments —
without modifications. Second, a significant number of bor-
rowers whose loans are modified will default again. “Finding
profitable modifications is not nearly as easy as it looks,”
says Paul Willen, a Boston Fed economist and a co-author of
the paper.
Also, the choice between foreclosure and modification
isn’t the only one lenders and borrowers face. “Short sales,”
in which the lender agrees to take a loss on the property, and
deeds in lieu of foreclosure, where the borrower hands over
the deed of the property to the lender, are alternatives. In
these cases, lenders often agree not to seek deficiency judg-
ments against borrowers. In states where lenders have 
more options for collecting money owed by borrowers,
economists Andra Ghent and Marianna Kudlyak find in
research published by the Richmond Fed that these options
are usually exercised more frequently and the probability of
default through foreclosure is also lower. 
Still, in some cases, foreclosure may be rational for 
borrowers, lenders, or both. A borrower with sufficiently
negative equity, for instance, might be better off to walk
away from the home. 
Foreclosed properties can become run-down and have a
negative effect on neighborhoods in which the property is
located. The negative externalities that result from these
foreclosures — including the decline in value of surrounding
houses in the same neighborhoods — might be big enough
to warrant government intervention, says Chris Foote, an
economist at the Boston Fed. The trouble comes in design-
ing a program to mitigate these potential problems without
causing other problems, such as encouraging people who
don’t need modifications to apply for them. 
Pinpointing the reason borrowers fall behind on mort-
gage payments would help in designing better programs
aimed at avoiding foreclosure. Economists disagree about
the causes of America’s increase in foreclosures. Foote and
co-authors suggest in a separate Boston Fed paper that 
the crisis stems from household income drops and an
unprecedented fall in house prices. What’s really needed is
significant but temporary assistance rather than the 
moderate and permanent assistance offered by loan modifi-
cation. “The right policy would be to extend unemployment
insurance benefits or make direct transfers,” Foote says. 
Atif Mian, an economist at the University of Chicago,
acknowledges that job losses and other negative income
shocks are important factors in rising foreclosure levels. 
But those aren’t the biggest reason for the large number of
foreclosures. Indeed, default levels started rising before
unemployment did. “The problem really started with an
overleveraged household,” he says. Therefore, the only 
solution for helping borrowers in trouble now is to reduce
the principal on their mortgages, Mian says. That’s a painful
process that involves changing contracts. 
To proponents of loan modification programs, renegotia-
tion of mortgages is “a type of public policy holy grail,” write
Willen and co-authors. That’s because modification policies
help borrowers and lenders at little or no cost to the govern-
ment. While the effectiveness of current programs is still to
be determined, policymakers would do well to monitor them
and the changes in borrower and lender behavior.  RF
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